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Corporate governance focuses its attention on the structure of the firm and 
the allocation of decision rights between owners and managers basically, 
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plus other stakeholders. The field has developed extensively during the last 
decades inspiring reforms and practices as well as learning from them. 
Most of the analysis though takes into consideration the XXth Century firm, 
rightfully so since CG is a very practical field in the overlapping map of 
law, economics and finance. The firm has probably been one of the most 
successful institutional innovations of the last centuries. Five hundred years 
ago only a few of them existed, today they are pervasive. Nevertheless, we 
cannot expect the firm to be the same a hundred years from now as it is today. 
And if companies are going to be different, how will their corporate 
governance be affected? The present article does not expect to give an 
answer to such question. It only attempts to provoke debate and speculation 
about a possible evolution of the firm based on one single aspect of 
change: the increased use of dispersed knowledge. After suggesting some 
development and analyzing present innovations in that direction, we will 
open up to consideration how those potential changes may affect corporate 
governance. Of course, there are no specific conclusions, just a call to open 
our minds to future possible scenarios. 
keY worDS:
Corporate governance, companies, knowledge.
CLaSSIfICaTIoN JeL:
G30, G34, G39
reSumeN
El gobierno corporativo pone su atención en la estructura de la firma y 
en la asignación de derechos decisorios básicamente entre propietarios y 
administradores, más otros “stakeholders”. Este campo ha crecido mucho 
en las últimas décadas inspirando reformas y prácticas, como también 
aprendiendo de ellas. 
La mayor parte de los análisis toman en cuenta la firma del siglo XX, lo cual 
se justifica puesto que el gobierno corporativo es una disciplina empírica en 
el área en donde se yuxtaponen el derecho, la economía y las finanzas. La 
firma ha sido probablemente una de las innovaciones institucionales más 
exitosas de los últimos siglos. Hace quinientos años había solo unas pocas, 
hoy se encuentran por doquier. No obstante, no podemos esperar que dentro 
de cien años la firma sea igual que la de hoy.
Y si las empresas serán distintas, ¿cómo se verá afectado su gobierno 
corporativo? El presente artículo no espera dar una respuesta a esta cuestión. 
Solamente intenta provocar un debate y una especulación sobre la posible 
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evolución de la firma basado en un solo aspecto de ese cambio: el creciente 
uso del conocimiento disperso. Luego de sugerir algún desarrollo y analizar 
las presentes tendencias en esa dirección abriremos la consideración de 
cómo esos cambios pueden afectar al gobierno corporativo. Por supuesto, 
no hay conclusiones específicas, solo una llamada a abrir nuestras mentes a 
posibles escenarios futuros. 
Palabras clave: Gobierno corporativo, compañías (firmas), conocimiento.
Clasificación JeL: G30, G34, G39.
reSumo
O governo corporativo põe sua atenção na estrutura da firma e na assignação 
de direitos decisórios básicamente entre propietários e administradores, mais 
outros “stakeholders”. Este campo tem crescido muito nas últimas décadas 
inspirando reformas e práticas, como também aprendendo delas. 
A maior parte das análises levam em conta a firma do século XX, o que 
justifica-se posto que o governo corporativo é uma disciplina empírica na 
área onde se justapõe o direito, a economia e as finanças. A firma tem sido 
provavelmente uma das inovações institucionais mais exitosas dos últimos 
séculos. Há quinhentos anos havia somente umas poucas, hoje encontram-
se por onde queira. Não obstante, não podemos esperar que dentro de cem 
anos a firma seja igual que a de hoje.
E se as empresas serão distintas, como verão-se afetado seu governo 
corporativo? O presente artigo não espera dar uma resposta a esta questão. 
Somente tenta provocar um debate e uma especulação sobre a possível 
evolução da firma baseado em um só aspecto dessa mudança: o crescente 
uso do conhecimento disperso. Logo de sugerir algum desenvolvimento e 
analizar as presentes tendências nessa direção abriremos a consideração 
de como essas mudanças podem afetar ao governo corporativo. Por certo, 
não há conclusões específicas, só uma chamada a abrir nossas mentes a 
possíveis cenários futuros.  
Palavras chave: Governo corporativo, companhias (firmas), conhecimento.
Classificação JeL: G30, G34, G39.
rÉSumÉ
Le gouvernement corporatif  attire l’attention sur la structure de l’entreprise et 
la répartition des droits de décision entre les propriétaires, les gestionnaires 
et  plusieurs d’autres partenaires. Ce champ a considérablement augmenté 
dans les dernières décennies, des réformes d’inspiration et des pratiques.
La plupart des analyses tiennent compte les entreprises du XXe siècle, qui se 
justifie parce que le gouvernement d’entreprise est une discipline empirique 
dans les domaines du droit, l’économie et les finances. Les entreprises sont 
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probablement une des innovations institutionnelles les plus réussies des 
derniers siècles. Cinq cents ans plus tôt, il y avait seulement quelques-uns 
et sont désormais partout. Cependant, les entreprises ne sont pas les même 
qu’hier.
Et si les entreprises sont différentes, comment le gouvernement corporatif 
sera-t-il affecté ? Cet article ne prétend pas vous donnez une réponse à 
cette question, juste essayer de susciter un débat sur l’évolution possible 
de l’entreprise sur un aspect de ce changement: l’utilisation croissante des 
connaissances dispersées. 
Après avoir suggéré un certain développement et d’analyser ces tendances 
dans cette direction, nous allons ouvrir la prise en compte de la façon dont 
ces changements peuvent influer sur la gouvernance d’entreprise. Bien 
sûr, aucune conclusion particulière, juste un appel à ouvrir nos esprits à 
d’éventuels scénarios futurs.
mots-clés: la gouvernance d’entreprise, les entreprises, la connaissance.
Classification JeL: G30, G34, G39.
1. kNowLeDge wIThIN ComPaNIeS 
In his seminal article “The nature of the firm” (1937), Ronald Coase introduced 
the concept of “transaction costs” which would, many years later, give rise 
to an entire new field called transaction costs economics and the economic 
analysis of organizations. 
His main point was an attempt to explain the existence and size of companies 
assigning resources within their borders through mandates considering that 
economists had already developed a sophisticated theory to explain how 
markets do precisely that through the price system. 
He says: “An economist thinks of the economic system as being co-ordinated 
by the price mechanism and society becomes not an organization but an 
organism”, quoting F. A. Hayek (1933) who was at the time a fellow professor 
at the London School of Economics. 
According to Coase, companies exist in order to save transaction costs, the 
costs of using the market, being the “most obvious” discovering what the 
relevant prices are. Companies would grow up to the point where the costs 
of organizing one more transaction within the company equal the marginal 
cost of such transaction in the marketplace. 
Therefore, markets are efficient allocators of resources but companies exist 
because it is more efficient in some cases to organize transactions within them 
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“The second scenario is the 
all-encompassing globalized 
company which meets all the 
needs of  their employees from 
cradle to grave and operate in 
almost every industry almost 
replacing « countries» a s 
the icon of  allegiance.” 
and save those costs. Coase also argued that there 
was not a clear cut divide between markets and 
firms but a continuum of different organizational 
devices. The borders between firms and markets 
may become blurred. 
But nowadays what we are watching is not 
only that, but an increased use of “market-
like” mechanisms within companies such as 
compensation schemes, internal prices and now, 
“information markets”. 
As the role of information has become more 
important, and new technological advances 
have revolutionized the way knowledge could be 
tapped, companies are experimenting in many 
different ways over how to use the knowledge 
that is dispersed within their own organizations. 
They are asking themselves the same question 
Hayek raised in his much quoted article “The use 
of knowledge in society” (1945), and they are 
answering it developing market mechanisms. 
The article will explore these new mechanisms 
such as predictive markets, information markets 
and others to find out how they mimic market 
mechanisms and whether they could work as 
markets do. 
This means that now not only the borders 
between companies are blurred but that markets 
are increasingly being used within companies 
instead of command and control procedures. 
Then, we will attempt to suggest a few ways 
in which the corporate governance of these 
companies may evolve. 
2. kNowLeDge DISPerSe ComPaNIeS 
In 1994, the Sloan School of Management at 
MIT started a research and education program 
called “Inventing the Organizations of the XXIth 
Century”, one of its main goals was to develop 
scenarios of possible future organizations. The 
initiative was not intended to be predictive, it 
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just tried to envision alternative future ways to 
organize work and the architecture of companies 
in the arriving century. 
Among other products of this initiative one 
was the paper “Two Scenarios for 21st Century 
Organizations: Shifting Networks of Small 
Firms or All-Encompassing ‘Virtual Countries’?” 
(Laubacher et al., 1997), where the authors 
imagine one possible way of organizing 
businesses as “performed by autonomous teams 
of one to ten people, set up as independent 
contractors or small firms, linked by networks, 
coming together in temporary combinations for 
various projects, and dissolving once the work is 
done”. As examples of this possible future trend 
they submit the film industry, textile production 
in the Prato region in Italy, Semco, a Sao Paulo 
based diversified conglomerate reputed for its 
extreme decentralized organization, and the 
radical outsourcing in producing goods such as 
athletic shoes, computer displays and software. 
The second scenario is the all-encompassing 
globalized company which meets all the needs of 
their employees from cradle to grave and operate in 
almost every industry almost replacing “countries” 
as the icon of allegiance. Employees would not 
introduce themselves as being “Japanese” or 
“American” but as members of Toyota, Sony or 
General Electric. “Employees own the firms in 
which they work, through pension plans, stock 
options, employee participation contracts, and 
other vehicles. And just as the modern nation 
states ultimately turned to democracy, many of 
the corporations of the twenty-first century have 
moved to representative governance”. 
The first of the scenarios may be developing 
now, among other manifestations of the trend, 
through what is now called “crowdsourcing” 
(Howe, 2008), which is basically looking outside 
the corporation towards the community of fans, 
customers, or basically anyone in order to 
organize and develop some of the tasks facing 
the corporation. These tasks may go from R&D 
(Innocentive: http://www.innocentive.com/; 
NineSigma: http://www.ninesigma.com/, Dell’s 
IdeaStorm: http://www.ideastorm.com/)1, to 
software development (Linux: http://www.linux.
org/; TopCoder: http://www.topcoder.com/)2; 
to advertisement development (there are 
several tournaments at YouTube to create ads 
for several different corporations); to product 
design (Threadless: http://www.threadless.
com/?=). 
The new business concept if very much based on 
Hayek’s seminal article “The use of knowledge in 
Society” (1945) where the author affirms that the 
nature of the problem economic theory wants to 
solve in order to build a rational economic order 
is the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances 
that need to be taken into account is never 
concentrated in a single mind but is dispersed 
among individuals in incomplete and often 
contradictory form. As the specific circumstances 
of “time and place” are impossible to transmit 
in a cost effective way, the need to empower the 
individual “in the spot” through a decentralized 
system of decisions becomes relevant to allow 
such information to be considered. But it is not only 
those particular circumstances that are needed for 
1 InnoCentive describes itself in the following way: “InnoCentive is a global, online marketplace where organizations in need 
of innovation –companies, academic institutions, public sector, and non-profit organizations– can utilize a global network of 
over 160,000 of the world’s brightest problem solvers.” NineSigma: “NineSigma enables clients to source innovative ideas, 
technologies, products and services from outside their organizations quickly and inexpensively by connecting them to the best 
innovators and solution providers from around the world. Our unique ‘Discover-Connect-Solve’ approach is based upon the 
principles of Open Innovation. Our clients access the largest and most comprehensive open network of scientific researchers 
in the world to solve their business needs”.
2 TopCoder describes itself as: “TopCoder is the first massively parallel, non-labor based end-to-end solution for the development 
of all things digital. No matter how big or small the project, from requirements discovery to design, build and test for applications 
ranging from small web, mobile and internal departmental apps to large ERP, CRM and decision support development and 
implementation, TopCoder is a platform that provides instant access to a vast wealth of resource”.
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a well coordinated system of decisions, the man 
on the spot needs information about what the 
others are doing, both consumers and suppliers, 
information that she gets in an abbreviated from 
through the price system. 
This “spontaneous order” then succeeds in 
incorporating the dispersed knowledge to play 
a role in the coordination of activities in the 
marketplace. Hayek describes it as a gigantic 
telecommunications system.
3. The gLoBaLIZeD ComPaNY 
But this article will concentrate on the second 
prototype of the corporation, the globalized 
company. We can now find several ingredients of 
markets “within” the companies. The principle of 
performance pay is quite similar as the way the 
market compensates a successful satisfaction of 
consumer’s needs. Also, as companies decentralize 
and organize themselves into profits or investment 
centers the relations between these units raise the 
issue of pricing products and services going from 
one to another within the same company. 
As the role of information has become more 
important, and new technological advances 
have revolutionized the way knowledge could be 
obtained, companies are experimenting in many 
different ways not only how to tap the dispersed 
knowledge within the “community” outside its 
specific borders, but also over how to use the 
knowledge that is dispersed within their own 
organizations. They are asking themselves the 
same question Hayek raised, and answering it 
developing market mechanisms. 
Jensen & Meckling (1992), picked up the issue 
several decades later: 
“But the internal organization of the capitalist firm 
is also an instance of the absence of alienable 
decision rights. Indeed, we distinguish activities 
within the firm from activities between the firm 
and the rest of the world by whether alienability 
is transferred to agents along with the decision 
rights. In this view transfers of decision rights 
without the right to alienate those rights are intra-
firm transactions. While firms can sell assets, 
workers in firms generally do not receive the rights 
to alienate their position or any other assets or 
decision rights under their control. They cannot 
pocket the proceeds. This means there is no 
automatic decentralized process which tends to 
ensure that there is no automatic decentralized 
process which tends to ensure that decision rights 
in the firm migrate to the agents that have the 
specific knowledge relevant to their exercise, 
and that there is no automatic performance 
measurement and reward system that motivates 
agents to use their decision rights in the interest 
of the organization. Explicit managerial direction 
and the creation of mechanisms to substitute for 
alienability is required”.
Actually, managers have taken this late advice 
and are designing market-like mechanisms “with” 
alienability, not without it. Take the case of the 
creation of a market in “talent” (Bryan et al., 
2006). The authors point out that most companies 
allocate decision rights through personal 
connections or transactions within limited groups. 
In a large corporation, how do they know where the 
most talented people for a specific position are? 
Supposedly senior managers or human-resources 
departments know it, but as the Hayekian argument 
would tell us, much information is lost, particularly 
the local and specific information about a certain 
human resource. There may be reports, or data 
bases, but the particular “circumstances” are not 
going to be there. IT development can certainly 
improve the search of information, and proposals 
in this direction have been presented by Idinopulos 
& Kempler (2003) and Agrawal et al. (2003), 
but the problem is not one of technology but of 
the use of information that is already available, 
though disperse.
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“As the role of  information 
has become more important, 
and new technological 
advances have revolutionized 
the way knowledge could 
be obtained, companies are 
experimenting in many 
different ways not only how to 
tap the dispersed knowledge 
within the «community» 
outside its specific borders, 
but also over how to use the 
knowledge that is 
dispersed within their 
own organizations.”
That is why they promote the formalization of 
“talent marketplaces”. How would they work?
“First of all, any marketplace must define what is 
being traded, how it is priced, and the operating 
protocols and standards. To facilitate exchanges, 
a formal talent marketplace also needs ‘market 
makers’: usually central human-resources staff 
in the case of managers, or staff assigned to 
help a format network executive (who might 
head, say, a center for software design) in the 
case of specialized professional talent” (Bryan 
et al., 2006). 
The description of the marketplace is not much 
different from how a traditional market “outside” 
the company works: positions required are 
posted on a website with confidentiality, with a 
description and all usual specifications related to 
location, compensation, duration. Will this mean 
that the company will be encouraging an internal 
competition that will eventually damage it, since 
different profit centers will compete among them 
raising the cost of labor? Actually yes, that is one 
of the consequences, but such a competition is 
already present with other employers, or is the 
result of a personal decision by a higher ranking 
manager. The mechanism will make sure that the 
human resource will be allocated to where it is most 
valued within the company and compensation 
may go up as much as any unit is willing to pay for 
it. Of course, in the presence of limited duration 
contracts that must be respected the agent will only 
be able to enter the marketplace for a position 
after she has completed the present contract. 
Bryan et al. reject competition through prices, or 
salaries because the “objective of business, is to 
maximize profits per worker rather than wages 
per worker”, but that is inconsistent with their 
support of a market for talent. As mentioned, the 
competition already exists with other employers, 
and if internal employers are not allowed to 
compete through prices they are going to compete 
through other fringe benefits or amenities which 
will eventually be as costly as a higher salary, 
although the authors believe competition will 
be only based on the nature of the assignments, 
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opportunities for growth, duration and personal 
contacts the position offers, which is beyond 
doubt. Besides, profit centers will be looking at 
their own returns and will not make a deal if it is 
not considered a good one. 
Information may even be more complete than in 
regular markets. Internal employers will not only 
have access to resumes or any other information 
posted or sent in by candidates, but also all formal 
evaluations available within the company. 
A similar proposal has been made with regard 
to a market in knowledge (Bryan, 2004). Raising 
the Hayekian problem of the use of dispersed 
knowledge Bryan points out three ways in 
which companies have tried to manage it: big 
investment in document-management systems 
with the hope that employees will eventually 
use them, distribution from the top which is not 
altogether useless since best-practices or new 
products can be reported from the top down and 
letting the organizational units solve their own 
knowledge problems. The third, a decentralized 
way, works but the localized solutions multiply 
standards and protocols and lack the second 
component of the price system: the distribution 
of information. 
The solution may lie in the institutionalization of 
an internal market in knowledge. The knowledge 
to be traded must be “distinctive”, in opposition 
to “common” knowledge which, by definition, 
is available to all, and must be in a form that 
allows its exchange. That is, it must become 
“formal” knowledge or a “knowledge object”. 
Consistent with the proposal on a talent market 
considered before, the author disregards money 
as one side of the exchanges to take place in 
the market for knowledge, and proposes instead 
a reward structure based on recognition, pay 
and promotion in order to incentive those with 
the knowledge to offer it. In one way or the 
other, that is through payments or rewards, 
intellectual property rights must be considered, 
though an internal market for knowledge does 
not necessarily have to mimic a patent system, a 
General Public License may be in order. 
“Prediction markets, also 
called «information markets», 
are specifically organized 
markets where contracts 
with payoffs tied to a certain 
future event are traded by 
participants. As with any 
other market, this trading 
leads to a market price that 
can be interpreted as the 
aggregated forecast of  
all participants.” 
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Future markets give us the best estimates that 
we can have at a certain moment with regard 
to a future event, since they take into account 
the information and expectations of all market 
participants. Nevertheless, is that correct? What 
kind of information do future prices give to us? 
Spot sales and purchases report us on the degree 
of scarcity or surplus in a market at a certain time, 
but future prices are “visions” or “opinions” on what 
the situation could be at a future date. Can we, 
therefore, say that the aggregated opinion of many, 
as reflected in a price, gives us better information? Is 
it not better the information an “expert” may have? 
Majorities can make mistakes and they usually do. 
For centuries they though the Earth was the center of 
the Universe until an “expert”, such as Copernicus, 
showed them it was not so (Surowiecki, 2004).
Prediction markets, also called “information 
markets”, are specifically organized markets 
where contracts with payoffs tied to a certain 
future event are traded by participants. As with 
any other market, this trading leads to a market 
price that can be interpreted as the aggregated 
forecast of all participants. 
There are already many of these markets, though 
probably the most researched is the Iowa Electronic 
Markets at the University of Iowa. Markets are 
organized for the sale and purchase of contracts 
based, among others, the results of future elections, 
the performance of some economic indicator, 
FED decisions on interest rates, the impact of flu 
or coming hurricanes. The market is (Berg et al., 
2001) defined as that organized with the goal to 
profit from the informational content in market 
valuations in order to make predictions over future 
events. In these markets, the price of contracts is 
dependent on those events and, therefore, they 
give information on their probability. 
The utility of these markets is related to the information 
they give to decision making. As an example, 
predictive markets could help political parties to 
select candidates looking at their “quotations” 
in these markets. In 1996, the Republican party 
selected Robert Dole as a candidate, a weak rival 
against Bill Clinton, but predictive markets were 
signaling, instead, that Colin Powell could have 
been a more powerful rival. 
Of course, the same kind of information is usually 
collected by polls, but polls are answered by 
anyone. In these markets, since there are gains 
and losses to make, it is expected that only those 
with more accurate information will participate. 
Media entertainment companies make regular 
use of predictive markets, and they can anticipate 
future revenues and adjust their marketing 
campaigns. They do it through the Hollywood 
Exchange Market (www.hsx.com), where one can 
find markets for the revenues of a certain film in 
the first six months after release, or six weeks, 
or weekly for the ten most important already 
released. In 2002 the HSX selected 35 of the 
eventual 40 winners of the Oscar prize.
Comments Hal Varian (2003): 
“Most political questions involve a combination of 
facts and values. One example might be: Does 
global warming exist and, if so, what should we 
do about it? The first question is about facts; the 
second is about values. 
Or consider a narrower economic question: What 
would be the impact on tax revenue of a cut in 
the dividend tax rate, and should we enact such a 
cut? There is presumably a factual answer to the 
first question, while the second depends on the 
value one puts on who gains and who loses from 
such a tax. 
There is no shortage of experts who will opine on 
the impact of global warming or dividend tax cuts, 
but it is often difficult for a nonexpert to evaluate 
their judgments. 
4. fuTureS markeTS aND PreDICTIve markeTS 
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Whom should you believe? How can a decision 
maker --or a voter-- appropriately weigh all those 
expert opinions? 
Economists believe financial markets do a pretty 
good job of aggregating information in part 
because they offer strong incentives to those 
who make good predictions. Prices of oil futures 
contracts predict future spot prices well because 
traders who make better predictions can make a 
lot of money”.
And Vernon Smith in his Nobel Lecture (2002, p. 
519): 
“What evidence do we have that the laboratory 
efficiency properties of continuous double 
auction trading apply also in the field? One of 
the best sources of evidence, I believe, is found 
in the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) used widely 
around the world (Forsythe, et al., 1992, 1999). 
These markets are used to study the efficacy of 
futures markets in aggregating widely dispersed 
information on the outcomes of political elections, 
or any well defined extra laboratory event, such 
as a change in the discount rate by the FED. 
The ‘laboratory’ is the internet. The ‘subjects’ 
are all who log on and buy an initial portfolio of 
claims on the final event outcomes; they consist 
of whom ever logs in, and are not any kind of 
representative or ‘scientific’ sample as in the polls 
with which they are paired. The institution is the 
open book double auction”.
5. PreDICTIve markeTS wIThIN ComPaNIeS 
Since predictive markets can be developed to 
get accurate forecasts over any future event, 
it is not strange that they have started to be 
used within companies, since they certainly 
need good forecasts not only on the economic 
situation in general but on their own product 
and services’ markets. 
Companies like Microsoft, Eli Lilly, Google and 
Hewlett-Packard are already using these markets 
in one way or another. The idea is to tap the great 
amount of knowledge that is dispersed within the 
many people working at these companies. 
Charles Plott from the California Institute of 
Technology and Kai-Yut Chen from the Hewlett-
Packard Research Lab designed an experiment, 
a market through which managers of different 
divisions would buy and sell bonds related to the 
expected increase of sales for the coming year. They 
could buy a bond for an increase of 1-2%, another 
for 3-4%, or for 5-6% and on. During certain time 
of the day managers could enter the marketplace 
and buy and sell bonds, which eventually led to a 
“market price” reflecting the aggregate evaluation 
on a sales forecast. Six of the eight events as 
this that were organized showed more accurate 
results for markets than the traditional process of 
aggregation of information within the company, 
usually meetings and reports from different units 
to a hierarchical top where the information is 
collected and a general forecast is defined. 
Eli Lilly organized an experiment with 50 employees 
from the R&D area asking them to buy and sell 
bonds representing the market chances for new 
drugs under development. The market predicted 
correctly three of the most successful. “Intel used 
a market to make a coordination decision: which 
factories should produce computer chips and when. 
In the experiment, a centralized, strategic plan was 
replaced with a market in which salesmen and a 
plant manager traded future contracts representing 
chips. The result was nearly 100% efficiency in 
allocating manufacturing capacity. That experiment 
echoed another, real-life market triumph. In 1998 
oil giant BP set out to reduce company-wide 
greenhouse emissions 10%. Instead of issuing 
plant-by-plant dictums, the company let plant 
managers trade permits to produce emissions. 
Managers who could quickly get their plants into 
compliance and reduce emissions even further 
could sell their permits to other plants. BP hit its 
reduction target – nine years early” (Kiviat, 2004).
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Chan et al. (2002) did the same for marketing 
research. They used bonds trading in order to 
measure preferences over new product concepts, 
in spite of the usual focus groups, concept tests 
or conjoint studies. The participants received an 
initial portfolio of cash and virtual stocks, they 
were also provided with detailed information on 
the products (and their corresponding stocks) 
including specifications, images and multimedia 
illustrations. Participants made trading decisions 
as they would do in a stock market: assessing the 
values of the stocks, selling those overvalued and 
buying those undervalued. While doing that they 
were essentially voting on the forecasted valued of 
the underlying products, and the price of the stock 
becomes an index of the product’s consumer 
value. The experiment was made on nine concept 
bike pumps and then with eight crossover vehicles 
(part SUV, part minivan, part luxury car), including, 
in the case of the cars, three existing products 
(Lexus, Mercedes and BMW) and five to be 
released (Pontiac, Acura, Buick, Audi and Toyota). 
6. INTerNaL markeTS 
Markets, as knowledge aggregation devices, 
are not only extending but they are also growing 
within companies. The entrepreneur not only has 
to evaluate each employee but also, as long as 
his company grows, will have to do the same 
with different divisions: business units, profit or 
investment centers. Such evaluation has basically 
two goals: to determine in what measure each 
business unit is contributing to generate value 
for the company; and to incentive the group to 
achieve whatever goals are selected. 
In order to do this, the entrepreneur or manager 
faces the problem of how the relations and 
exchanges among the different units and between 
these and the general management will be. Each 
company has a certain structure of production, 
a process through which certain resources are 
turned into products or services. Some will 
certainly be “core” activities, while others will 
support these. “Core” may include the purchase 
“Markets, as knowledge 
aggregation devices, are not 
only extending but they 
are also growing within 
companies. The entrepreneur 
not only has to evaluate each 
employee but also, as long as 
his company grows, will have 
to do the same with different 
divisions: business units, 
profit or investment centers. 
Such evaluation has basically 
two goals: to determine in 
what measure each business 
unit is contributing to generate 
value for the company; and to 
incentive the group to achieve 
whatever goals are selected.”
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of inputs, processing, packaging, sales and 
post-sale services; services may include legal, 
accounting, human resources, maintenance, 
public affairs and others. 
The manager or businessman will try to achieve 
the goals before mentioned with each of his 
business units. In order to do this, each input 
going to a business unit or the product or service 
coming out of it must have a certain measurable 
value: a price. This means we are going to find 
a certain price structure “within” the company. 
Economic calculation is what the entrepreneur 
must do, but she needs prices since otherwise, 
how could she do it? Production Unit A buys 
fruits and converts them into marmalade; which 
goes into unit B where they are packaged in 
glass recipients; going to unit C where they are 
packaged into cardboard boxes to be distributed 
by unit D. The entrepreneur must know that at 
the end of the process she gets a profit, good 
enough to continue with the process. But she 
does not know how much of it comes from each 
unit, or how much do any of them lose. 
She could have such information, for example, 
adding up the costs generated at each stage, but 
she would still have to allocate general and fixed 
charges. The price of an intermediate product 
or service is a cost for the unit receiving it and 
revenue for that sending it, in both cases it is a 
price. And as in the external market, these prices 
are an essential incentive guiding the production 
process and indicating to each unit how much to 
produce in order to get as much value as possible. 
“The problem is an important one, because the 
prices which are set on internal transfers affect 
the level of activity within divisions, the rate of 
return on investment by which each division is 
judged, and the total profit that is achieved by 
the firm as a whole” (Hirshleifer, 1956).
If the entrepreneur takes only into account unit’s 
costs she cannot achieve the above mentioned 
goals. Let’s see this through a simple example: 
a single production unit transfers a product to a 
sales unit which puts it in the market: 
“The manager or 
businessman will try to 
achieve the goals before 
mentioned with each of  his 
business units. In order to 
do this, each input going to a 
business unit or the product or 
service coming out of  it must 
have a certain measurable 
value: a price. This means 
we are going to find a certain 
price structure «within» 
the company.” 
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Figure 1. In this case there is a market Price. The 
Production Unit can sell the intermediate product 
to the external market for 700 and get a profit 
of 100. The Sales Unit can buy the intermediate 
product to Production at 700 and then complete 
the process to have it ready for sale at a cost 
of 400; its total costs are 1,100 and its profit is 
400. That is Production gets 20% of profits and 
Sales 80%. 
This is a very different situation. The entrepreneur 
now knows the contribution margin for the Sales 
Unit is much higher than the one of the Production 
Unit, signaling something must be done with this 
late one or that the comparative advantage lies 
with marketing and sales. On the other hand, 
if each unit gets a retribution linked to its own 
generation of value, they will be incentive to 
increase it. 
When transfers between units are made at market 
prices, they will reflect better their real economic 
contribution to the total profits of the company. 
As long as the Production Unit is able to compete 
with external production, it will always be better to 
get the supply from them, and Production will also 
prefer to sale internally, giving it an additional 
margin of competitiveness saving Coase’s 
“transaction costs” (including sales taxes). 
This turns most companies into a set of business 
units with “market-like” relations between them. 
There is not much difference from the coordination 
the impannatori do with the textile producers in 
the Prato region in Italy, although this is not meant 
to say that such a direction is not needed. 
Production
Cmg600
Sales 
Cmg  400  
Client pays
1.500
The production unit has a marginal cost, that is, 
of producing one additional unit, of 600, and the 
sales unit, of 400; total cost is 1,000, and a sale 
of 1,500 produces a total profit of 500. How do 
we evaluate who generated more value and how 
do we incentive them? If we base our decision 
on costs, Production gets 60% and Sales 40%, 
but are they contributing in such proportion? 
Furthermore, are we not giving them an incentive 
to generate more costs in order to have a 
larger proportion? Paradoxically, we would be 
unleashing a competition among them to see 
who is more “inefficient”. 
On the contrary, if we now introduce “internal 
prices”, and these reflect market prices, we will 
have such information and we will generate the 
right incentives. 
Figure 2.
Production
 
Cmg 600
Market price 
700  
Client pays
1.500
Sales
Cmg 400
7. The fuTure of CorPoraTe goverNaNCe 
If companies, at least with respect to the use of 
knowledge, are evolving in such direction, how will 
their corporate governance be affected? Laubacher 
et al. (1997) imagine it in the following way: 
“Employees own the firms in which they work, 
through pension plans, stock options, employee 
participation contracts, and other vehicles. And 
just as the modern nation states ultimately turned 
to democracy, many of the corporations of the 
twenty-first century have moved to representative 
governance. Our firm is one where employee-
shareholders have the right to elect the 
management of the company, not just the board 
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of directors, but managers at almost every level 
throughout the organization. Decisions are made 
hierarchically, but every year, on election day, 
we choose from slates of managers who vow 
to do the best job for the company as a whole. 
Since our livelihoods depend on the choice, 
nearly all of us take advantage of the keiretsu’s 
‘open books’ financial reports, which provide a 
constantly-updated overview of the business’s 
priorities and assets. 
Some people think of the system as paternalistic 
and bureaucratic. But actually, there is very little 
‘fat’ in the system. Nepotism, ossified command 
structures, and sinecures don’t last long, since 
everyone benefits from improved performance. 
Specialist ‘organization designers’ travel through 
the massive alliances, brokering partnerships 
and helping make sure that people communicate 
effectively across boundaries. All of us tend to get 
along, because our companies attract people who 
agree with the prevailing attitudes. We all know 
the ‘Shell/Daewoo way’, and we live and die 
according to it.”
Such scenario is possible, although considering 
all Public Choice has already said with regard to 
the functioning of democracies, and looking at 
the populist slogans or the campaign expenses 
of the modern democracies one has to wonder 
whether such arrangement will be efficient enough 
to survive in the competition of the marketplace. 
It is, certainly, incomplete, but it may give us a 
good start to consider ideas that, by its nature, 
must only be speculative. 
Actually, once all employees become shareholders 
there may not be a need to regular elections 
since they can express their preference by selling 
at any time. The election of a new management 
could be sparked by the fall in the price of stock 
below a certain level, but taking into account how 
stock prices are affected by an economic policy 
situation way beyond the management’s reach, 
more sophisticated indicators should be devised: 
for example a certain percentage deviation from 
the industry’s stock index, allowing then to filter 
the general economic conditions.
A futures or “predictive” market on the possibilities 
of the price of stock reaching such “trigger” clause 
could probably give advance information on the 
aggregate evaluation all employees may have on 
the performance of top managers and whether 
the strategies they are following or the policies 
they are implementing will keep them at their jobs 
or will take them to the electoral test. 
But the assumption that only employees own the 
firm is limited. Besides, if they do it through their 
pension funds the decision to buy and sell will be 
made by them, and it will not reflect the specific 
knowledge the employees may have. Certainly, 
the pension funds play an important role in CG 
by setting up the standard of “best practices”, and 
it will probably still be important that a certain 
percentage of the company’s capital is owned by 
outsiders of the firms since their decisions to buy 
and sell transmit the market perspective on the 
future performance of the firm. 
Therefore, if employees are not going to be the sole 
owners a new way should be considered in order to 
elicit their knowledge, meaning, a new or separate 
market. Outside shareholders may be willing to set 
up a specific kind of shares, employees’ shares or 
rights to regular stock that may trade in a specific 
market, allowing them to reach that information. 
And they may have a chance to participate at the 
“predictive” market themselves. 
A number of issues arise: should the employees 
receive the same amount of shares or different as 
part of their compensation packages? What will 
the role of the Board be? 
It certainly looks like information technology 
will push or allow companies to move in the 
direction of more democracy, although rather 
than “representative democracy”, the present 
model where shareholders elect Board members, 
it will be “direct democracy”, where shareholders 
elect managers directly or even decide strategic 
issues. It cannot reach the point where most of 
the decisions are taken through polls; one of the 
main problems of direct democracy is that it asks 
voters to decide on very complex issues which they 
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would not be able to grasp without professional 
training and sophisticated information. Defenders 
reply that it is because they will have to decide 
that they will get informed but definitely voters 
cannot get the expertise managers have, that is 
where the Board gets a role.
But the advantage of predictive markets is that it 
does not rely on votes, and even less on “one 
person, one vote”, but people “putting their money 
where their mouth is”, a much stronger incentive 
to be informed and use your local knowledge.
The real evolution of firms and their corporate 
governance structures will certainly be different 
than this, we cannot anticipate what the ingenuity 
of institutional entrepreneurs will bring to us, 
but at least we can play with some ideas and 
speculations. That is what entrepreneurs do, only 
that they bet on them. 
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